The convergence of equilibrium strategies of approximating signaling games

DOI10.1007/BF01213909zbMath0852.90134MaRDI QIDQ1920952

Alejandro M. Manelli

Publication date: 6 August 1996

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

perfect Bayesian equilibriuminfinite signaling games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (2)

A never-a-weak-best-response test in infinite signaling games ⋮ Perception games and privacy

Cites Work

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• Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
• Multidimensional signalling
• Correlated equilibrium in games with type-dependent strategies
• Cheap talk games may have unique, informative equilibrium outcomes
• Subgame perfect equilibrium in continuous games of perfect information: An elementary approach to existence and approximation by discrete games
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
• Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
• Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Perfect Information
• Signalling with Many Signals
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Market Equilibrium with Hidden Knowledge and Self-Selection
• Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
• Generalized Equilibrium Results for Games with Incomplete Information
• Informational Equilibrium
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Cheap Talk and Sequential Equilibria in Signaling Games

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