The role of communication in resolving commons dilemmas: Experimental evidence with heterogeneous appropriators
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Publication:1922702
DOI10.1006/jeem.1994.1029zbMath0854.90035OpenAlexW2025927248MaRDI QIDQ1922702
Publication date: 18 September 1996
Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.1994.1029
Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (7)
Cooperation in the commons with unobservable actions ⋮ Fragility of the commons under prospect-theoretic risk attitudes ⋮ Non-binding agreements and fairness in commons dilemma games ⋮ Local and global interactions in an evolutionary resource game ⋮ Sharing rules for a common-pool resource in a lab experiment ⋮ The effect of access to clean technology on pollution reduction: an experiment ⋮ Strategic complements, substitutes, and Ambiguity: the implications for public goods.
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