Guilty until proven innocent -- regulation with costly and limited enforcement

DOI10.1006/JEEM.1994.1030zbMath0854.90049OpenAlexW1966103226MaRDI QIDQ1922703

Joseph E. Swierzbinski

Publication date: 18 September 1996

Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/31347

zbMATH Keywords

polluting firmoptimal regulationsemission control costs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Related Items (2)

Regulation with direct benefits of information disclosure and imperfect monitoring ⋮ ON OPTIMAL ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION AND ENFORCEMENT: INFORMATION, MONITORING AND EFFICIENCY

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