Self-fulfilling expectations, history, and big push: A search equilibrium model of unemployment
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Publication:1923977
DOI10.1007/BF01258620zbMath0855.90041OpenAlexW2058243568MaRDI QIDQ1923977
Publication date: 12 January 1997
Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01258620
Related Items
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment
- The Bargaining Problem
- Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining
- Stability of Equilibria with Externalities
- Security Equilibrium
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations
- Costly Search and Recruiting
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