Expected revenue of all-pay and first-price sealed-bid auctions with affiliated signals

DOI10.1007/BF01258621zbMath0855.90043MaRDI QIDQ1923978

Wolfgang Leininger, Erwin Amann

Publication date: 13 October 1996

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

linkage principleall-pay sealed-bid auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

All-pay auctions with private signals about opponents' values ⋮ Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints ⋮ An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction ⋮ Optimal mechanism design when both allocative inefficiency and expenditure inefficiency matter ⋮ A class of \(N\)-player Colonel Blotto games with multidimensional private information

Cites Work

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• Patent competition, rent dissipation, and the persistence of monopoly: The role of research budgets
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Optimal Auction Design

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