Minimal winning coalitions in weighted-majority voting games

DOI10.1007/s003550050039zbMath0858.90145OpenAlexW4248453090MaRDI QIDQ1924534

Steven J. Brams, Peter C. Fishburn

Publication date: 20 October 1996

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050039

zbMATH Keywords

minimal winning coalitionsleast winning coalitionsweighted-majority voting games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (8)

On Dedekind's problem for complete simple games ⋮ FREEDOM OF CHOICE AND WEIGHTED MONOTONICITY OF POWER ⋮ Majority voting leads to unanimity ⋮ On weights and quotas for weighted majority voting games ⋮ A generating functions approach for computing the public good index efficiently ⋮ Simple games versus weighted voting games: bounding the critical threshold value ⋮ There are more strategy-proof procedures than you think ⋮ Weighted committee games

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