Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent feasible sets and private information

DOI10.1007/S003550050041zbMath0855.90008OpenAlexW4238026914MaRDI QIDQ1924536

Lu Hong

Publication date: 20 October 1996

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050041

zbMATH Keywords

social choiceBayesian implementableimplementation for exchange economiesstate dependent feasible sets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (6)

The optimal design of a market ⋮ Implementation with renegotiation when preferences and feasible sets are state dependent ⋮ Feasible mechanisms in economies with type-dependent endowments ⋮ A characterization of optimal feasible tax mechanism ⋮ Feasible Bayesian implementation with state dependent feasible sets ⋮ The endowment game when \(n = 2\)

This page was built for publication: Bayesian implementation in exchange economies with state dependent feasible sets and private information