Logrolling and a McGarvey theorem for separable tournaments
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Publication:1924538
DOI10.1007/s003550050043zbMath0855.90007OpenAlexW2248049401MaRDI QIDQ1924538
Michel Le Breton, Guillaume Hollard
Publication date: 3 February 1997
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050043
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