Low-quality leadership in a vertically differentiated duopoly with Cournot competition

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.12.096zbMath1253.91115OpenAlexW2026482387MaRDI QIDQ1925642

Luca Lambertini, Alessandro Tampieri

Publication date: 18 December 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://amsacta.unibo.it/4490/1/WP750.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

product qualityendogenous timingsequential play

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

Related Items (3)

Time-cost substitutability, earlycutting threat, and innovation timing ⋮ The outsourcing conundrum: Misappropriation of intellectual property in supply chains ⋮ ENDOGENOUS TIMING IN QUALITY CHOICES AND PRICE COMPETITION

Cites Work

• On the social desirability of patents for sequential innovations in a vertically differentiated market
• Price competition, quality and income disparities
• Stackelberg-solvable games and pre-play communication
• Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria
• Monopoly and product quality
• Effect of credible quality investment with Bertrand and Cournot competition
• Relaxing Price Competition Through Product Differentiation

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