On the belief (in-)dependence of sequential equilibria

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.129zbMath1253.91024OpenAlexW3125153134MaRDI QIDQ1925660

Hans Carlsson, Philipp C. Wichardt

Publication date: 18 December 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.129

zbMATH Keywords

existencebeliefssequential equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Belief-Free Equilibria in Games With Incomplete Information
• Sequential Equilibria
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?

This page was built for publication: On the belief (in-)dependence of sequential equilibria