On the implementability of contracts without quasilinear utility

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.103zbMath1253.91083OpenAlexW2121154452MaRDI QIDQ1925675

X. Ruiz del Portal

Publication date: 18 December 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.103

zbMATH Keywords

incentive compatibilitymonotonicity constraintsoptimal mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items

Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types ⋮ Incentive compatibility in non-quasilinear environments

Cites Work

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• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Monotonicity in direct revelation mechanisms
• Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional Screening
• Non‐smooth monotonicity constraints in optimal control problems: Some economic applications
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation

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