Double implementation in Nash and \(M\)-Nash equilibria

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2012.01.021zbMath1253.91065OpenAlexW1967386364MaRDI QIDQ1925688

Jianxin Yi

Publication date: 18 December 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.01.021

zbMATH Keywords

double implementationNash implementation\(M\)-Nash implementationmechanism with transfers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Implementation via mechanisms with transfers
• Double implementation in Nash and strong Nash equilibria
• Implementation with coalition formation: A complete characterization
• An algorithm for checking strong Nash implementability
• Strongly implementable social choice correspondences and the supernucleus
• Implementation under strong equilibrium. A complete characterization
• Walrasian Analysis via Strategic Outcome Functions
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality

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