Corruption driven by imitative behavior

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.092zbMath1254.91068OpenAlexW1965652547MaRDI QIDQ1925854

Elvio Accinelli, Edgar J. Sanchez Carrera

Publication date: 27 December 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.092

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary dynamicscorrupt behaviorimitative behaviorinstitutions and operations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (5)

Political corruption and public activism: an evolutionary game-theoretic analysis ⋮ The power of voting and corruption cycles ⋮ A predator-prey economic system of tax evasion and corrupt behavior ⋮ Can the indifferent population affect the spread of rumors? ⋮ Who controls the controller? A dynamical model of corruption

Cites Work

• Which one should I imitate?
• Why imitate, and if so, how? A boundedly rational approach to multi-armed bandits
• Imitative Behavior in a Two-Population Model
• Unnamed Item

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