Fairness and fairness for neighbors: the difference between the Myerson value and component-wise egalitarian solutions

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.05.020zbMath1254.91021OpenAlexW1846668434MaRDI QIDQ1925896

Philippe Solal, Eric Rémila, Sylvain Béal

Publication date: 27 December 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/36857/1/MPRA_paper_36857.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessMyerson valuecomponent-wise egalitarian solutionsfairness for neighborstwo-step value

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items (17)

Component-wise proportional solutions for communication graph games ⋮ Efficient extensions of communication values ⋮ An Owen-type value for games with two-level communication structure ⋮ On the existence of efficient and fair extensions of communication values for connected graphs ⋮ Two efficient values of cooperative games with graph structure based on \(\tau\)-values ⋮ Cost sharing on prices for games on graphs ⋮ Union-wise egalitarian solutions in cooperative games with a coalition structure ⋮ The sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest games and an application to sharing a river with bifurcations ⋮ Tree solutions and standardness for cycle-free graph games ⋮ Efficient extensions of the Myerson value ⋮ An efficient and fair solution for communication graph games ⋮ The Myerson value for directed graph games ⋮ Fair distribution of surplus and efficient extensions of the Myerson value ⋮ Null, nullifying, or dummifying players: the difference between the Shapley value, the equal division value, and the equal surplus division value ⋮ Weighted component-wise solutions for graph games ⋮ The Myerson value on local structures of coalitions ⋮ Solidarity within a fixed community

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Solidarity in games with a coalition structure
• An efficient and fair solution for communication graph games
• Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
• Bidding for surplus in network allocation problems
• A TWO-STEP SHAPLEY VALUE FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH COALITION STRUCTURES
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games

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