The co-evolution of reciprocity-based wage offers and effort choices

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.05.033zbMath1254.91050OpenAlexW3122523023MaRDI QIDQ1925916

Philipp Schliffke

Publication date: 27 December 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.033

zbMATH Keywords

indirect evolutionreciprocityefficiency wagesgift-exchange

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability
• Psychological games and sequential rationality
• A theory of reciprocity
• Fairness and Contract Design
• COMPETITION OR CO‐OPERATION: ON THE EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS OF TRUST, EXPLOITATION AND MORAL ATTITUDES
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence

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