Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.06.019zbMath1254.91531OpenAlexW2089380075MaRDI QIDQ1925929

Sebastian Kranz, Susanne Goldlücke

Publication date: 27 December 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.019

zbMATH Keywords

monitoringdelegationrelational contractsjob designmoral hazard in teams

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Heterogeneous agent models (91B69)

Uses Software

• repgames

Cites Work

• Infinitely repeated games with public monitoring and monetary transfers
• Observability and incentive in organizations
• Relational Incentives and Moral Hazard in Teams

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