A strategic mediator who is biased in the same direction as the expert can improve information transmission

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.050zbMath1254.91355OpenAlexW2112223101MaRDI QIDQ1925957

Lydia Mechtenberg, Johannes Münster

Publication date: 27 December 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.050

zbMATH Keywords

mediationcommunicationinformationcheap talk

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Communication via a strategic mediator
• Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
• When mandatory disclosure hurts: Expert advice and conflicting interests
• Strategic Information Transmission

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