An exploration in school formation: income vs. ability

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.048zbMath1254.91520OpenAlexW2103878933MaRDI QIDQ1925960

Sinan Sarpça, Nejat Anbarci, Ahmet U. Alkan

Publication date: 27 December 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.048

zbMATH Keywords

stable matchingpeer effectsassortative matchingmultilateral bargainingschool formation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

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• Admission, Tuition, and Financial Aid Policies in the Market for Higher Education
• Estimating the Payoff to Attending a More Selective College: An Application of Selection on Observables and Unobservables
• A Two-Sided Discrete-Concave Market with Possibly Bounded Side Payments: An Approach by Discrete Convex Analysis
• Beauty Is a Beast, Frog Is a Prince: Assortative Matching with Nontransferabilities
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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