One-sided population monotonicity, separability, and the uniform rule
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Publication:1925973
DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00266-5zbMath1254.91286OpenAlexW2089068167MaRDI QIDQ1925973
Publication date: 27 December 2012
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(02)00266-5
separabilityaxiomatic characterizationsuniform ruleeconomies with single-peaked preferencesone-sided population monotonicity
Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
Related Items (3)
Bribe-proofness for single-peaked preferences: characterizations and maximality-of-domains results ⋮ A note on the separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences ⋮ More on the uniform rule: characterizations without Pareto optimality
Cites Work
- Resource-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- The replacement principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
- Population-monotonic solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
- Resource-monotonic allocation when preferences are single-peaked
- The separability principle in economies with single-peaked preferences
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- Consistency, monotonicity, and the uniform rule
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