Manipulability in matching markets: conflict and coincidence of interests

DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0549-yzbMath1280.91126OpenAlexW2139822873MaRDI QIDQ1926598

Itai Ashlagi, Flip Klijn

Publication date: 28 December 2012

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0549-y

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

On the exhaustiveness of truncation and dropping strategies in many-to-many matching markets, Optimal truncation in matching markets

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