Extending the Condorcet jury theorem to a general dependent jury
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Publication:1926602
DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0546-1zbMath1280.91060OpenAlexW2100840815WikidataQ57921096 ScholiaQ57921096MaRDI QIDQ1926602
Publication date: 28 December 2012
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-011-0546-1
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