Matching with partially ordered contracts
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Publication:1926642
DOI10.1007/s13160-012-0073-1zbMath1254.91523OpenAlexW2088517889MaRDI QIDQ1926642
Akihisa Tamura, Rashid Farooq, Tamás Fleiner
Publication date: 28 December 2012
Published in: Japan Journal of Industrial and Applied Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13160-012-0073-1
Related Items
Matching with partially ordered contracts, Review of the theory of stable matchings and contract systems, A Note on a Two-Sided Discrete-Concave Market with Possibly Bounded Salaries, Choice functions on posets, Stable marriage with general preferences
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