Sequentially two-leveled egalitarianism for TU games: characterization and application
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Publication:1926794
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2012.02.014zbMath1253.91019DBLPjournals/eor/LeeD12OpenAlexW2060112979WikidataQ57832913 ScholiaQ57832913MaRDI QIDQ1926794
Theo S. H. Driessen, Joo Sung Lee
Publication date: 29 December 2012
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2012.02.014
transferable utility gamesequential approachpotential representationland corn production economyscale-dummytwo-leveled egalitarianism
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Cites Work
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