Truth-telling and Nash equilibria in minimum cost spanning tree models

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2012.05.023zbMath1253.91033OpenAlexW2002579407MaRDI QIDQ1926969

Mich Tvede, Jens Leth Hougaard

Publication date: 29 December 2012

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2012.05.023

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumShapley valueincomplete informationBayesian Nash equilibriumminimum cost spanning treetruth-telling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43)

Related Items (13)

Sharing sequential values in a network ⋮ Cost allocation in asymmetric trees ⋮ Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks ⋮ Routing-proofness in congestion-prone networks ⋮ Characterization of monotonic rules in minimum cost spanning tree problems ⋮ Minimum cost connection networks: truth-telling and implementation ⋮ An egalitarian solution to minimum cost spanning tree problems ⋮ A non-cooperative approach to the folk rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems ⋮ The degree and cost adjusted folk solution for minimum cost spanning tree games ⋮ Trouble comes in threes: core stability in minimum cost connection networks ⋮ Free intermediation in resource transmission ⋮ Coalitional efficient profit-sharing ⋮ CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE KAR AND FOLK SOLUTIONS FOR MINIMUM COST SPANNING TREE PROBLEMS

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