Selling to the highest valuation bidder under risk aversion and asymmetry

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00326-9zbMath1254.91242MaRDI QIDQ1927306

Domenico Menicucci

Publication date: 1 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionoptimal auction design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Optimal Auction Design

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