Simultaneous moral hazard and adverse selection with risk averse agents

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00322-1zbMath1254.91281OpenAlexW2024574312MaRDI QIDQ1927310

Bernd Theilen

Publication date: 1 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(02)00322-1

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionmoral hazardadverse selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Related Items (1)

A comparison of cardinal tournaments and piece rate contracts with liquidity constrained agents

Cites Work

• Regulation of a risk averse firm
• Optimal contract mechanisms for principal-agent problems with moral hazard and adverse selection
• Threat-based incentive mechanisms under moral hazard and adverse selection

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