What limits escalation? - Varying threat power in an ultimatum experiment

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00063-6zbMath1254.91088OpenAlexW2116858130MaRDI QIDQ1927326

Gerlinde Fellner, Güth, Werner

Publication date: 1 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(03)00063-6

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessbargainingpunishmentthreat power

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• Perfect versus imperfect observability -- an experimental test of Bagwell's result
• Fairness in ultimatum games with asymmetric information and asymmetric payoffs
• Dictator game giving: Rules of fairness versus acts of kindness
• From Ultimatum Bargaining to Dictatorship-an Experimental Study of Four Games Varying in Veto Power
• The relevance of equal splits in ultimatum games

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