Optimal trading mechanisms for an informed seller

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00154-XzbMath1254.91256MaRDI QIDQ1927367

Rolf Tisljar

Publication date: 1 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designinformed principal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

On the informed seller problem: optimal information disclosure

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values
• Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values

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