A general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism
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Publication:1927373
DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(03)00151-4zbMath1254.91292OpenAlexW1979073048WikidataQ59567292 ScholiaQ59567292MaRDI QIDQ1927373
Publication date: 1 January 2013
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(03)00151-4
General equilibrium theory (91B50) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)
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Cites Work
- An intersection theorem on an unbounded set and its application to the fair allocation problem
- Rental Harmony: Sperner's Lemma in Fair Division
- Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
- No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods
- Incentives in Teams
