Selling less information for more: garbling with benefits

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2003.11.003zbMath1254.91715OpenAlexW2171448838MaRDI QIDQ1927478

David C. Croson, Thomas A. Weber

Publication date: 1 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://infoscience.epfl.ch/record/187526

zbMATH Keywords

value of informationlimited liabilitygarblingportfolio investment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to actuarial sciences and financial mathematics (62P05) Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) Decision theory (91B06) Portfolio theory (91G10)

Related Items (1)

Simple methods for evaluating and comparing binary experiments

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Long Cheap Talk
• Economic Comparability of Information Systems
• Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments

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