Uncertainty of time intervals and possibility of collusion in infinitely repeated games

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2003.11.018zbMath1254.91039OpenAlexW2082034297MaRDI QIDQ1927508

Tomohiko Kawamori

Publication date: 1 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2003.11.018

zbMATH Keywords

collusioninfinitely repeated gamesuncertainty of time intervals

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
• Information and Timing in Repeated Partnerships
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames

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