Using bidder asymmetry to increase seller revenue

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2003.12.003zbMath1254.91246OpenAlexW3125511767MaRDI QIDQ1927520

Paul Povel, Rajdeep Singh

Publication date: 1 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2003.12.003

zbMATH Keywords

auctionscommon valueasymmetric bidders

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Optimal IPO mechanism with retail investors and two asymmetric institutional investors

Cites Work

• Optimal Auction Design
• Asymmetric Auctions

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