Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2004.06.013zbMath1254.91519OpenAlexW2075007225MaRDI QIDQ1927736

Antonio Romero-Medina, José Alcalde

Publication date: 2 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/5594

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitysequential mechanismsmatching problems

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (8)

The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism ⋮ A finite decentralized marriage market with bilateral search ⋮ Take-it-or-leave-it contracts in many-to-many matching markets ⋮ Subgame perfect implementation of stable matchings in marriage problems ⋮ Non-revelation mechanisms in many-to-one markets ⋮ Noncooperative formation of coalitions in hedonic games ⋮ Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm ⋮ Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations
• Implementation of college admission rules
• Simple mechanisms to implement the core of college admissions problems

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