The battle of the sexes when the future is important

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2004.10.006zbMath1254.91038OpenAlexW2044029197MaRDI QIDQ1927790

Kjell Hausken

Publication date: 2 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11250/184329

zbMATH Keywords

discountingrepeated gametoughnessconflictbattle of the sexes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

Stubbornness, power, and equilibrium selection in repeated games with multiple equilibria ⋮ Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria ⋮ Whether to attack a terrorist's resource stock today or tomorrow

Cites Work

• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent
• Unnamed Item

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