Monotonicity in direct revelation mechanisms

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2004.12.022zbMath1254.91290OpenAlexW3122260956MaRDI QIDQ1927855

Diego García

Publication date: 2 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.12.022

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicitymechanism designmulti-dimensional allocation rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (4)

On the implementability of contracts without quasilinear utility ⋮ Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types ⋮ Optimal delegation with multi-dimensional decisions ⋮ On optimal regulation of price and R\&D with asymmetric information

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Monopoly and product quality
• Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional Screening

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