Loss avoidance as selection principle: evidence from simple stag-hunt games

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2004.12.027zbMath1254.91095OpenAlexW2136600697MaRDI QIDQ1927868

Ondrej Rydval, Andreas Ortmann

Publication date: 2 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2004.12.027

zbMATH Keywords

experimentscoordination gamesselection principlesstag-hunt gamesloss avoidance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (11)

A Note on Payoff Equivalence of the Volunteer's Dilemma and the Stag Hunt Game and Inferiority of Intermediate Thresholds ⋮ Social framing effects: preferences or beliefs? ⋮ Loss avoidance as selection principle: evidence from simple stag-hunt games ⋮ Stake size and the power of focal points in coordination games: experimental evidence ⋮ When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory ⋮ Solving coordination failure with ``all-or-none group-level incentives ⋮ Restricted and free-form cheap-talk and the scope for efficient coordination ⋮ Prospect dynamics and loss dominance ⋮ Analyzing behavior implied by EWA learning: an emphasis on distinguishing reinforcement from belief learning ⋮ Coordination and focality under gain-loss framing: experimental evidence ⋮ Reference-dependent preferences, super-dominance and stochastic stability

Cites Work

• The effects of costless pre-play communication: experimental evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
• Loss avoidance as selection principle: evidence from simple stag-hunt games
• Unnamed Item

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