Strategic candidacy, monotonicity, and strategy-proofness

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2005.01.017zbMath1254.91127OpenAlexW1995758881MaRDI QIDQ1927884

Yusuke Samejima

Publication date: 2 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.01.017

zbMATH Keywords

axiomatic approachsocial choicepolitical economyelection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Characterizing the resolute part of monotonic social choice correspondences

Cites Work

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• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• Candidate stability and nonbinary social choice
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• Nonbinary Social Choice: An Impossibility Theorem
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures