When does the game end? Public goods experiments with non-definite and non-commonly known time horizons

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2005.02.010zbMath1254.91159OpenAlexW1981890224MaRDI QIDQ1927891

M. Vittoria Levati, Luis G. González, Güth, Werner

Publication date: 2 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.02.010

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationend-game effectpublic goods experiment

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (4)

The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma experiment ⋮ Finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments without a commonly known end ⋮ Fairness Norms Can Explain the Emergence of Specific Cooperation Norms in the Battle of the Prisoner's Dilemma ⋮ Unraveling public good games

Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

• Tacit cooperation, strategic uncertainty, and coordination failure: Evidence from repeated dominance solvable games
• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information

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