Strategyproofness, non-bossiness and group strategyproofness in a cost sharing model

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2005.05.012zbMath1254.91137OpenAlexW2057211639MaRDI QIDQ1928660

Suresh Mutuswami

Publication date: 3 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.05.012

zbMATH Keywords

non-bossinessmechanism designstrategyproofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

Collusion-proof mechanisms for multi-unit procurement ⋮ Group strategyproof cost sharing: the role of indifferences ⋮ Non-bossiness ⋮ Egalitarian equivalence and strategyproofness in the queueing problem ⋮ On cost sharing in the provision of a binary and excludable public good ⋮ Group strategyproofness in queueing models ⋮ Strategic requirements with indifference: single-peaked versus single-plateaued preferences ⋮ Coalitional efficient profit-sharing ⋮ Strategy-proof cost sharing under increasing returns: improvement of the supremal welfare loss

Cites Work

• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
• Strategy-Proof Exchange
• Strategyproof sharing of submodular costs: budget balance versus efficiency