Coalition-proofness and dominance relations

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2005.05.023zbMath1254.91019OpenAlexW1983987648MaRDI QIDQ1928684

Ryusuke Shinohara

Publication date: 3 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://soar-ir.repo.nii.ac.jp/record/2628/files/Coalition-proofness_dominance_relations.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

coalition-proof Nash equilibriumweak dominationstrict domination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (6)

Secure implementation in allotment economies ⋮ Two-Group Contests with Communication Within and Between Groups ⋮ Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes ⋮ Coalition-proofness under weak and strong Pareto dominance ⋮ COALITION-PROOF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN A NORMAL-FORM GAME AND ITS SUBGAMES ⋮ Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game

Cites Work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• On the coalition-proofness of the Pareto frontier of the set of Nash equilibria
• On coalition-proof Nash equilibria in common agency games
• A voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good
• Double implementation of Lindahl allocations by a pure mechanism

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