Participation fees vs. reserve prices in auctions with asymmetric or colluding buyers

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2005.06.006zbMath1254.91229OpenAlexW2063174569MaRDI QIDQ1928714

René Kirkegaard

Publication date: 3 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.06.006

zbMATH Keywords

collusionreserve pricesparticipation fees

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Controlling collusion in auctions: the role of ceilings and reserve prices

Cites Work

• All equilibria of the Vickrey auction.
• Optimal Auction Design
• Asymmetric Auctions

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