Implementing the efficient allocation of a persistent pollutant in the presence of threshold effects

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2005.07.004zbMath1254.91548OpenAlexW2038287411MaRDI QIDQ1928720

Francisco Candel-Sánchez

Publication date: 3 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.07.004

zbMATH Keywords

implementationthreshold effectsexternalities

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Cites Work

• On the dynamics of the regulation of pollution: Incentive compatible regulation of a persistent pollutant
• Nash implementation of a proportional solution to international pollution control problems
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• To Tell the Truth: Imperfect Information and Optimal Pollution Control

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