The suboptimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2005.07.014zbMath1254.91036OpenAlexW2082841588MaRDI QIDQ1928733

Luca Colombo, Paola Labrecciosa

Publication date: 3 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.07.014

zbMATH Keywords

scale economiesoptimal punishmentstrigger strategiescartel stabilitysecurity level

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Special types of economic markets (including Cournot, Bertrand) (91B54)

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The optimality of optimal punishments in Cournot supergames

Cites Work

• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
• Some results on optimal penal codes in asymmetric Bertrand supergames
• Optimal punishments in linear duopoly supergames with product differentiation
• Optimal penal codes in nearly symmetric Bertrand supergames with capacity constraints
• Optimal Penal Codes in Price-setting Supergames with Capacity Constraints
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames