Tinbergen and Theil meet Nash: controllability in policy games

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2005.08.002zbMath1254.91012OpenAlexW2115870279WikidataQ56115419 ScholiaQ56115419MaRDI QIDQ1929033

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 7 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/12178/files/wp050132.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibrium existencepolicy gamespolicy ineffectivenessstatic controllability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Controllability (93B05) Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Related Items (6)

DYNAMIC CONTROLLABILITY WITH OVERLAPPING TARGETS: OR WHY TARGET INDEPENDENCE MAY NOT BE GOOD FOR YOU ⋮ Controllability in policy games: Policy neutrality and the theory of economic policy revisited ⋮ Tinbergen controllability and \(n\)-player LQ-games ⋮ ``Whatever it takes: a plea for active monetary policies ⋮ Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games ⋮ Towards a New Theory of Economic Policy: Continuity and Innovation

Cites Work

• The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory

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