On the profitability of reducing competition in all-pay auctions with risk averse bidders

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2005.12.014zbMath1254.91208OpenAlexW1976840127MaRDI QIDQ1929102

Domenico Menicucci, Ilaria Cingottini

Publication date: 7 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.12.014

zbMATH Keywords

risk aversionall-pay auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Auctioning risk: the all-pay auction under mean-variance preferences ⋮ Harmful competition in all-pay auctions

Cites Work

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• All-pay auctions with risk-averse players
• Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• On the Effects of Entry in Cournot Markets
• Strategic Pricing, Consumer Search and the Number of Firms
• On the Value of Competition in Procurement Auctions

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