Mechanism design for arbitrary type spaces

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2005.12.005zbMath1254.91250OpenAlexW1986457120MaRDI QIDQ1929107

Vasiliki Skreta

Publication date: 7 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.12.005

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designrevenue equivalencenon-convex type spaces

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (4)

Optimal selling mechanisms under moment conditions ⋮ Abstract types and distributions in independent private value auctions ⋮ Optimal auction design under non-commitment ⋮ Shifting supports in Esö and Szentes (2007)

Cites Work

• Optimal Auction Design
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets

This page was built for publication: Mechanism design for arbitrary type spaces