Nash implementation of the majority rule

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2005.12.018zbMath1254.91128OpenAlexW2065437627MaRDI QIDQ1929117

M. Remzi Sanver

Publication date: 7 January 2013

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2005.12.018

zbMATH Keywords

majority ruleNash implementationMaskin monotonicityminimal monotonic extensions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items

On the structure of voting systems between two alternatives, Strategy-proofness and weighted voting, Characterizations of majoritarianism: a unified approach, A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model

Cites Work

• A simple characterization of majority rule
• Another characterization of the majority rule.
• The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result
• Nash implementation of matching rules
• A new characterization of the majority rule
• A complete characterization of majority rules
• Maskin monotonic aggregation rules
• Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision