The public release of information in first-price sealed-bid auctions

DOI10.1007/S10058-012-0115-9zbMath1282.91137OpenAlexW2008731557MaRDI QIDQ1929136

Pierre-Henri Morand, François Maréchal

Publication date: 7 January 2013

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0115-9

zbMATH Keywords

informationauctionsrisk-aversion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

Cites Work

• Manipulative auction design
• Asset Prices and Trading Volume in a Beauty Contest
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding

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