Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction
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Publication:1929138
DOI10.1007/s10058-012-0117-7zbMath1282.91135OpenAlexW2132586718MaRDI QIDQ1929138
Publication date: 7 January 2013
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0117-7
Related Items (2)
A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction ⋮ Nash implementation via mechanisms that allow for abstentions
Cites Work
- A full characterization of Nash implementation with strategy space reduction
- Nash implementation without no-veto power
- On Nash implementation of social choice correspondences
- Nash Implementation: A Full Characterization
- Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
- Implementation Via Nash Equilibria
- Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
- A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation
- On the necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash implementation
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