Conditions for incentive compatibility in models with multidimensional allocation functions and one-dimensional types

DOI10.1007/s10058-012-0131-9zbMath1282.91141OpenAlexW2118237856MaRDI QIDQ1929140

Publication date: 7 January 2013

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-012-0131-9

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism design incentive compatibility optimal contract sub-utility function

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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